FOFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR *

Hederal Bureau of Investigation United States Department of Instice Washington 25, D.C.

February 10, 1953

PERSONAL AND CUNFIDENTIAL VIA LIAISON



Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Administration Building
Room 123
2430 E Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Dulles:

I thought you would be interested in the following information furnished by an informant who has given this Bureau reliable information in the past, and which is purported to represent statements made by Soviet officials stationed in Europe. The informant believes these persons are important officials of the Soviet Ministry of State Security (MGB).

Joseph Stalin is very ill and has designated Malenkov (Georgi Malenkov) to act for him. Malenkov is the strongest man in the Soviet Union and the army has been subordinated to him. The Soviets will initiate an "offensive" through Yugoslavia and Turkey in the Spring of 1953, or, at the latest, in the Spring of 1954, unless Stalin is still alive. Stalin will not allow them to start "any fights" while he is still alive. The Soviet officials who are in favor of war believe that Communism in Europe and Asia can only be protected through action in Yugoslavia and Turkey. They will attack where the West is the weakest and, while the United States is worried about the Far East, the Soviets will cause trouble in the Near East.

SECURITY INFORMATION - TOP SECRET

FBI REVIEW COMPLETED

DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C 20//
NEXT REVIEW DATE:

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Administration Building

Tito must be eliminated within three months (after January, 1953) and the Croatians will do the job. One hundred sixty Croatians are being trained now. (Informant believes the training is being carried out in or near Vienna, Austria.) The Soviets indicated they have "Draguntchek" (phonetic) or "Kukolevitch" (phonetic) available to replace Tito and stated that either one is the "real man" of the people.

The Soviets have made "fantastic technical and chemical" achievements in Siberia. They believe that since the United States has a "warrior" in the White House they must be ready and must anticipate the actions of the United States leaders and be just ahead of the United States.

They recognize a need for "terror" in the Soviet Union. The leaders of the Ministry of State Security are not too apprehensive about enemies outside of the Soviet Union but are more concerned with enemies within that country. They are particularly concerned with the "most loyal, older" Communists, including some at the very top. These people were described as "tired aristocrats" of Communism. Most of the trouble comes from those who have brains (the intellectuals). They lack stability, their minds, tastes and allegiance frequently change. The youth are imitating these old men and the Ministry of State Security must continue to "cleanse" the Party, bring up the new, young element and, at the same time, retain the old men who are not "tired." The informant believes that the Soviet leaders presently in control of the Soviet Union feel that some of the old Party members have grown away from the masses and they must return to the old revolutionary ways of terror to stamp out this tendency. It was stated that Beria (Laurenti Beria, a leading Soviet intelligence officer) is already having trouble and may have more trouble after Stalin dies.

- 2 -

Approved For Release 2003/10/29: CIA-RDP80R01731R000800090003-6

Mr. Allen W. Dulles Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency Administration Building

The Soviets believe that they must also have "terror and sabotage" in the United States. The informant understood this to mean that underground Communists in the United States would engage in acts of "terror and sabotage."

President Eisenhower and Secretary of
State Dulles are considered as the best two statesmen
the United States has ever had. The Soviets are still
seeking information with which to compromise President
Eisenhower but have not been successful to date and
have not found anyone to "cut Eisenhower's wings."
They had a "couple of setups" but nothing came of them.

The Soviets do not believe that either General Ridgway or General Mark Clark is doing a good job in his present position.

I am unable to furnish a complete and definite evaluation of the above information. The informant has furnished valuable and reliable information in the past concerning domestic intelligence matters and in numerous instances it has been possible to corroborate such information through other sources. It is possible, of course, that the Soviets have "planted" the information which is set forth above, for deceptive purposes; however, there is no indication that this has been done.

This informant is expected to furnish valuable information in the future and for his protection it is requested that these data be treated as top secret.

The above information has also been furnished to the Attorney General; Honorable Robert Cutler, Administrative Assistant to the President; Honorable James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security

Approved For Release 2003/10/29: CIA-RDP80R01731R000800090003-6
SECURITY INFORMATION - TOP SECRET

Mr. Allen W. Dulles Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency Administration Building

Council; Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission; Brigadier General Edward H. Porter, USAF, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Major General Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Special Investigations, The Inspector General, USAF; Major General Richard C. Partridge, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, Director of Naval Intelligence.

With assurances of my highest regards,

Sincerely yours,

J. 2 down 24 over

- 4 -

Approved For	Release 2003/10/29 CM	-PINDROPO17	31R000800090003-6					
4	•							
SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET								
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION			REGISTRY					
SOURCE	4		CIA CONTROL NO.					
FBI			76857					
DOC. NO. NONE	Ltr to Mr. Dulle	95	DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED					
DOC. DATE 10 Feb 53			13 Feb 53					
COPY NO.			LOGGED BY					
NUMBER OF PAGES 4			flg					
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS			Ŭ					
none								
ATTENTION: This form will be attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret material is limited to those individuals whose official duties relate to the material. Each alternate or assistant Top Secret Control Officer who receives and/or releases the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. The name of each individual who has seen the Top Secret document and the date of handling should be indicated in the right-hand columns.								
DECEMBER TO	DEGERALD	BELFACED	erry by					

DD/I AD/CI AD/CI 2/16 1300 7eb 1630 16/2 CS/INT 7eb 1630 7eb 1630 193. CS/STRA 11/2 1000 12/2 1000 12/2 1000 108 NO. 8001731- 2/10 1045 3/11 15/5 FOLDER NO. 19 105/INT DE	ILLI ZIIIIED TO			TEL CHOLD				
AD/CT CS/INT CS/STRA CS/STR	OFFICE	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	NAME AND OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE
AD/CT CS/INT CS/STRA CS/STR								
AD/CT CS/INT CS/STRA CS/STR	DD/I			-	2/18	0900	noted DDII	13 del
25/NT C\$\strack{5}\text{TRA} DOD SOLUTION 21-2 100 2-2 800 21-2 1000 21					16			11.1 25X
25/NT CS/STRA DOD SO/I EL 1000 193 1000 2/1000	AD/CI		216	1300	tel	1630		16/2
25/57RA 1	,	4	16		.17			1 4 1
25/57RA 1	CS//NT		Feb	1630	Feb	1000		19 tel.
2/26 1670 2/26 1670	-61		17,				The second secon	adati
2/26 1670 2/26 1670	CS/STPA		Fet	1000			the state of the s	24 1ch-
2/26 1650 2/26 1650 2/26 1650 2/26 1650 2/26 1650 2/27 1020 JOB NO. 800/73/- 3/17 1045 3/17 15/5 FOLDER NO. 9 2/27 1045 3/17 15/5 FOLDER NO. 19 2/285 1750 E.R. DECLASSIFIED CLASS. SHAMEED TO: TS S C 20/1 NEXT REVIEW HATE: AUTH: HR TOTAL AUTH	000]					* /	
2/26 1650 2/26 1650 3/9 3/9 5000 JOB NO. 800/73/- 3/9 - 3/17 1000 BOX NO. 9 3/17 1045 3/17 15/5 FOLDER NO. 19 CS/INT DE 10/NC PMAY 1235 JUNE 1500 BOCUMENT NO. 10 PART 1250 BOCUMENT NO. 10 PROCHASE IN GLASS. NO. 10 CLASS. SHAMED TO: TS S C 20/1 NEXT REVIEW WATE: 4 AUTH: HR TOS D AUTH: HR TOS D AUTH: HR TOS D	001		76-2	100	2-2	300		
2/4 3/9 1000 JOB NO. 800173/- 00/1	NAUD]				7		
00/ a D/C 1 3/17 1045 3/17 15/5 FOLDER NO. CS/INT DE 10/NE May 1232 June 1200 BOX NO. FOLDER NO. 10/NE TOTAL DOCS HEREIN NO CHANGE IN CLASS. A DECLASSIFIED CLASS. SHANGED TO: TS S C 20// NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR 104	011/4		2/26	1650				
00/ a D/C 1 3/17 1045 3/17 15/5 FOLDER NO. CS/INT DE 10/NE May 1232 June 1200 BOX NO. FOLDER NO. 10/NE TOTAL DOCS HEREIN NO CHANGE IN CLASS. A DECLASSIFIED CLASS. SHANGED TO: TS S C 20// NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR 104	xA	1	3/2		3/			3.2
3/9 - 3/17 1040 BOX NO. 3/17 1045 3/17 15/5 FOLDER NO. CS/INT DE 10/NC TOTAL DOCS HEREIN NO CHANGE IN CLASS. A DECLASSIFIED DEASS. SHANGED TO: TS S C 20// NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR 104	CIC		19		19	ove	IOR NO 80017	31-12
adje i SINT	001]						
SINT OSINT OSI	201		3/9	_	3/17	1000	BOY NO S	E .
CS (INT DE 10/NC TOTAL DOCS HEREIN 194 1230 DOCUMENT NO. HO CHANGE IN CLASS. A DECLASSIFIED CLASS. SHANGED TO: TS S C 20// NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR TOS			,	,	7/		BOX 1810.	
CS (INT DE 10/NC TOTAL DOCS HEREIN 10/NC May 1332 DECLASSIFIED CLASS. SHANGED TO: TS S C 20// NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR 104	apici	1	3/17	1045	717	1515	FOLDED NO 19	
DE C/NC DOCUMENT NO. HO CHANGE IN GLASS. HO CHANGE IN GLASS. SHANGED TO: TS S C 20// NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR 10.5			, .		/		FULUER NO	
DE C/NC DOCUMENT NO. HO CHANGE IN GLASS. HO CHANGE IN GLASS. SHANGED TO: TS S C 20// NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR 10.5	CSINT						7071	
DE C/NC DOCUMENT NO. HO CHANGE IN GLASS. HO CHANGE IN GLASS. SHANGED TO: TS S C 20// NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR 10.5	/				25/10	1	JUIAL DECS HEREIN _	
E.R. BOUWERT RU. 10/NC May 13.3 June 1500 BOUWERT RU. RO CHANGE IN CLASS. CLASS. SHANGED TO: TS S C 20// NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1 AUTH: HR 10.5	DE		a		1856	1230		T T
E. C. DECLASSIFIED CLASS. SHANGED TO: TS S C 20// NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR TO-	111		21		1			
AUTH: HR 10-5	ICINC		may	123-	an	1500	DED! ASSISTED	r place 1
AUTH: HR 10-5					0		CLASS, CHANGED TO: TS S C.	01/ 25X
AUTH: HR 10-5	E.K.	/					NEXT REVIEW DATE:	
DECICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PRO							- 21 MAR / /	Table
					HE D	O CTD		
(EXECUTIVE REGISTRI OF THE 31 THE THEVIEWERS)		,	(EXECU	IAF W	Tile 1 11	1053	1
1930					<u> </u>		1939	

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

THE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:	BY (Signature)	
DOWNGRADED [
DESTROYED		
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO	OFFICE	DATE
		1

TOP SECRET